We Need to Talk about Research Security
Some researchers might know what research integrity issues are. Experts like Elisabeth Bik and Mu Yang show examples of inappropriate image duplication on social media every day, Anna Abalkina regularly writes about hijacked journals, and outlets like Retraction Watch, For Better Science and Dorothy Bishop's blog carefully put it all in perspective and chronicle about the implications of those findings.
But most researchers probably don't know what research (or knowledge) security issues are. So, let’s first start with a definition. The European Union defines research security as “the safeguarding of scientific activities against misuse and undue influence by third countries or non-state actors”. A breach in research security is often much harder to detect than a breach in research integrity, which is probably also the reason why most scientists and institutions aren't very aware of it. Have you ever considered that an exchange student might walk away with sensitive data when the internship or PhD project is over? Have you ever considered that the real goal of the student was not to engage in your research project, but to be close to the military base 30 miles away? And if you ever considered it, would your department or institute be able to detect such a breach of research security?
I know this might all sound rather abstract, so let's focus on an example: China. The Dutch intelligence agency has warned in several annual reports in a row that China is the biggest threat against research security. Similarly, the FBI states that China’s efforts specifically target academic institutions and researchers.
Why all these warnings? A single reason: China has laid down a detailed plan to be the world's leading power by 2050 and research has a crucial role to play in that plan. In fact, Xi Jinping himself has stated that "strengthening basic research is an imperative for higher-level self-reliance and greater strength in science and technology, and is the only path to building China into a world leader in science and technology"
But how is China going to perform this Herculean task?
China is making it very attractive for universities abroad to hire Chinese (PhD) students, using the Chinese Scholarship Council as a financial backbone. There are some caveats, though. To get such a scholarship, students need to report back to the Chinese embassy, swear allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party and return to China two years after their PhD project has been successfully completed. Chinese students abroad are also heavily monitored and sometimes intimidated by the Chinese government, which has led some Dutch universities to suspend their participation in these programs.
In addition, the counter-espionage law and the law on foreign relations have been implemented by China in 2023. These laws make it possible for Chinese authorities to gather intelligence not only through their intelligence agencies, but also through students, academics, businesses and interest groups operating abroad. The Chinese government is thus able to interfere with people who have a Chinese background and who are living in another country. They may even be asked or forced to gather intelligence for the Chinese government.
So it seems like China has put systems in place to make sure they will meet their self-imposed 2050 target of becoming the world's leading nation. Even if it means that they have to coerce their own people to engage in espionage activities to get there in time.
I’m not writing this blog post to overwhelm you or give you a sense of hopelessness. I do not want to encourage Sinophobia either. It is important to realize that the average Chinese person is very similar to you and me: they have meaningful lives, a fulfilling job and enjoy spending time with friends and family. However, that does not mean that we have to accept attempts from China’s authoritarian regime to undermine Western research efforts.
Universities should therefore monitor research security on a daily basis. Department heads and human resources departments should receive training to recognize the signs of potential research security breaches. This will pose a challenge as China often denies access to online sources or is deliberately deceptive when it comes to the information found on these sources, as described in this report. I therefore also suggest that each university appoints qualified personnel overseeing research security in general. These departments should work closely with national and international intelligence agencies.
I hope I made it clear that research security is an important topic. So, are we ready to talk about it?
Rene Aquarius is a researcher at the neurosurgery department at the Radboud university medical center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. His forensic scientometric work has been discussed by Science, Nature and Retraction Watch. He previously (co-)wrote blogs for Dorothy Bishop’s blog and for the Times Higher Education.
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I agree with the general scope of the post and thank you for bringing this issue to the fore. This is such an important but also critical issue that whenever it comes up, those who raise concerns can be accused of xenophobia and even worse of racism. I see that when you gave the example of China, you felt the need to make a prior explanation for similar situations by saying “I do not want to encourage Sinophobia either”. The very fact that you feel the need to explain this shows how effective it is to abuse things, not only to misuse them, but also to manipulate them and suppress the opposing view.
Having said that, of course, I think that the example you have given is still relatively innocent in the context of the subject matter, even if it means something. You have summarized the CSC scheme very well. The CSC program has been in place for maybe decades between China and Western countries. There may be concerns and objections, of course, but at the end of the day it has always been a legal structure. If either side wants to end it, it doesn't work anymore. There are already countries that have abolished the CSC program in recent years.
Are you aware that there is a much bigger threat than the CSC program, which is more dangerous, untraceable, runs directly on the host country's resources without a sponsoring country like the Chinese government, while at the same time abusing the diversity and inclusion programs of universities? I mean Iran.
As your location is the Netherlands, the Dutch academia can be a nice example, because the Iranian threat I am talking about is not only in Europe, it is an academic network that is intriguingly interconnected to Iranian research groups in almost every country in the world. I am talking about papermills, citation manipulation, nepotism in recruitment, nepotism in the distribution of research funds in a country. And of course, the fact that all of this is Iran-centered makes it easy for information in Western countries to be transferred to Iran. The closest example of this is the Shahed drones that Russia is using in Ukraine today and the Iranian satellites that are integrated into these drones. Each of these is more dangerous than the Chinese threat you mentioned because they are very difficult to trace.
Western countries have long since welcomed Iranian researchers into their universities, especially in technical departments. At first this was purely humanitarian. People who didn't want to live under a repressive regime, but believed they could make a contribution to society, were given these opportunities in many Western countries. However, today we see that, with the concept of diversity and inclusion, these people who had the opportunity to pursue their careers in different countries around the world have, over the past decades, not only established academic groups in their own locations that only Iranians can benefit from, but have also established an informal network with Iranian groups in different parts of the world. Dear Dr. Aquarius, you can easily observe the points I mentioned below in your own country because your country is a popular Iranian papermilling station. With this network, basically;
(A) A mediocre engineering student from any university in Iran can very easily be accepted into a PhD program in the US, Canada, Europe or Australia. This is because Iranian professors who are already in high positions in these countries are bending the rule of diversity and inclusiveness that was once given to them in favor of their own people.
(B) Iranian researchers in any Western country can easily strengthen their academic record through Iran-based papermill organizations in Iran and become popular researchers with high citation counts and a high h-index in order to distinguish themselves in competition with their colleagues in the country they are located. In this way, they can obtain more academic funding and prioritize Iranians when hiring with the funding (see point A).
(C) There is a very strong Iranian grouping, especially in the engineering fields. This is of course the result of decades of humanitarian support programmes for Iranian researchers. However, today, for example, a project proposal by an Iranian researcher in the Netherlands for funding from the European Union may reach another Iranian professor working in the same field through a single-blind review process, and this project proposal may receive an unfairly high score just because of ethnic affinity. This scenario is not a possibility, it is a reality. And it is easy to prove it, if the fund managers so wish. I would like to note that, of course, another ethnic group can commit the same abuse, but I have never seen a Canadian or an American unfairly over-scoring a proposal in favour of another Canadian or American.
(D) An Iranian professor in the Netherlands may like the topic of a project won by another researcher in the Netherlands and then the professor pass on the same idea to his Iranian friend in Canada. It is almost impossible to identify similarities between the projects because they are not in the same country. At the end of the day, however, the fact that academic careers are built on the ideas of others and that an ethnically based diaspora is further strengthened is something that everyone is aware of but is afraid to speak out about.
(E) Iranian professors in Europe can host many Iranian researchers who completed their PhD in Iran for 1-3 years at their universities, either as visiting researchers or even through the postdoctoral programmes of the European Union (I think it's called the Marie Curie programme), and then through this network they can either become professors in another Western country or return to Iran and get involved in the engineering processes of the Iranian regime. Have Western countries taken any measures against this so far? Of course not.
(F) Iranian academic groups, which can monopolise globally in certain engineering fields, also allow the publication of many substandard works in academic journals, both as editors and reviewers. I have exemplified above what the increasing number of citations and h-indexes have led to.
As I mentioned at the outset, unlike the CSC program and its scope, these examples are very difficult to trace because they are not created by bilateral agreements, but by the unfortunate abuse of the tolerance that was created years ago by the humanitarian approach of people. And it is still not seriously discussed in any Western country. Only forbetterscience occasionally makes very good points and keeps it on the agenda.
Thanks for this nice post.